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#Zimbabwe: The big five imperatives post the contested election

  • pridemkono
  • Sep 8, 2023
  • 4 min read

President Emmerson Mnangagwa. (Source: EPA-EFE)

By Pride Mkono

On August 26, 2023, a compromised Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared ZANU PF's Emmerson Mnangagwa as the presidential winner of the shambolic general election held on August 23 and 24, 2023. Observers across the board condemned the election as failing to meet provisions of the Constitution, the electoral laws of Zimbabwe, and regional and international standards for democratic elections. In simple terms, the charade that ZEC and the regime conducted fell short of the basic requirement of a 'free, fair, credible and verifiable' election. The opposition released strongly worded statements condemning the election and dismissing its outcomes and nothing beyond that. Mnangagwa has since been inaugurated for a second five-year term in a ceremony headlined by South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Members of Parliament and local authority representatives have also been sworn in. By all indications, it looks like Zimbabwe is going again for another five years under ZANU PF misrule. In between muffled protestations from the opposition and arrogant triumphalism from the ruling party, there is a need to provide a clear perspective on the key imperatives of this contested election. In this analysis, I provide the five BIG imperatives which should shape our collective thinking and planning as we continue the struggle for democratisation.


1. Mnangagwa will seek a third term

Amid the chaotic aftermath of the shambolic election there has been a deafening silence on the fact that according to provisions of section 95 of the Constitution, Mnangagwa is serving his second and last term as President. For the opposition and civil society, the silence has been partly because they dismissed the election as a sham and are calling for a fresh election. On the other hand, Mnangagwa and ZANU PF have deliberately remained silent on the issue because they have an interest in amending the provision. Through his 'one-party state' campaign rhetoric and so-called 'Vision 2030' postulations; it is apparent that Mnangagwa harbours ambition to be president beyond the constitutional limit of two 5 years terms. This is an imperative which will create a political and constitutional crisis within the coming two to three years as he seeks to extend his rule beyond the set limits.


2. Deepening elite discohesion and factionalism

The result of the disputed election shows that Mnangagwa, just like in 2018, lost to ZANU PF. In several constituencies where ZANU PF parliamentary and local government candidates won, Mnangagwa lost to his archrival, Nelson Chamisa. The incumbent is unpopular within the party rank and file as well as the broader electorate. Thus, the ruling party is already deeply divided over Mnangagwa and this will be worse as succession contestations heat up. Rifts among the elites in ZANU PF, state security apparatus and the deep state will widen as the race to succeed Mnangagwa heats up. The Chiwenga faction will seek to position itself for takeover, but it is likely to be met with stiff resistance and competition from other factions. The next few years will witness a gripping political soap opera reminiscent of Mugabe's last days.


3. Authoritarian clampdown and co-option of the opposition

In his bid to amend the Constitution and continue as president beyond the two-term limits, Mnangagwa's government will intensify clampdown on all forms of opposition. Arrests, imprisonment without trial, dubious convictions, abductions, torture and even murder will increase in frequency and intensity. Political prisoners like Job Sikhala and Jacob Ngarivume will continue to languish in the dungeons. While ZANU PF lacks a constitutional majority to automatically amend the Constitution, it lacks this by a narrow margin in the National Assembly. Opposition political elites will therefore be targeted for co-option into the regime agenda. Direct and indirect payouts will be dished out to compromise and but cooperation from elected opposition members of parliament and persecute the most vocal. It will be a carrot-and-stick approach, and this is another imperative in the coming years.


4. Worsening international and regional isolation

Zimbabwe will remain isolated from international platforms, especially the Common Wealth which has been Mnangagwa's obsession since taking over following a military coup in November 2017. The damning SADC report, which all but concluded that the 23 August election was a sham, has left Mnangagwa exposed in the region. The country has been an ongoing regional problem since 2000 and most SADC Head of State and diplomats tolerated Mugabe but are not prepared to bend to Mnangagwa's whims and caprices. He will thus face a regional backlash and isolation on the back of his shambolic return to power. It will become more apparent when he seeks to amend the Constitution for a third term. Further, the influx of illegal immigrants, particularly to South Africa and Botswana, will strain relations between Harare and countries in the region.


5. Political instability and the high threat of a coup

Mnangagwa came to power on the back of a military coup in 2017 and he promised to do things differently. However, the last six years have proved beyond doubt that he was after power for its own sake and the wealth that comes with it. While iron-fisted repression has emasculated opposition and silenced active dissent, the country is on edge and generally politically unstable. The election has left Mnangagwa politically limping as he lacks legitimacy and his claim to power is questionable. Furthermore, there is a high likelihood that he will seek to subvert the Constitution and seek a third term. These factors, spurred by general economic hardships faced by many citizens, amplify the possibility of a military coup. A coup against Mnangagwa will be very popular and he will never gain regional or international support. Such a position makes his political position highly untenable and will only make him paranoid and hard-handed. This response will only make his grip on power much more likely to be liquidated through a coup as happened to Robert Mugabe in 2017.


Given the above imperatives, Mnangagwa will not attend to the urgent issues of resolving economic, political and social problems facing the nation. This means that most of the people will remain dissatisfied with his leadership and ready to support any movement with the capacity to liquidate him. It is therefore important to build strong community-embedded resistance structures to channel and direct people's anger towards a national civil disobedience and nonviolent campaign to end Mnangagwa's illegal rule. He is already limping on one leg and concerted political effort will certainly push him out and create opportunities for democratisation and economic recovery.


Pride Mkono is a political analyst and social justice activist. He writes here in his capacity and can be contacted at pridemkono@gmail.com or X @MkonoPride.

 
 
 

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